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INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS: LIMITATIONS
IMPOSED ON EFFECT AMERICAN COURTS MAY GIVE
TO FOREIGN CONFISCATIONS
Where a foreign government purports to confiscate its citizen's
assets although located within the United States, the Second Cir-
cuit has held that both federal and state courts must deny effect
to the confiscation unless it is consistent with United States law
and policy. This result obtains because such a confiscatory decree
constitutes an "act of state" within the category of actions deemed
by the Supreme Court in Sabbatino to necessitate a uniform fed-
eral rule.
AN IMPORTANT FEATURE of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,1
decided by the Supreme Court in 1964, was its holding that the
Act of State doctrine2 is a matter of federal law binding upon the
states.3 That doctrine, as articulated by the Court, provides that "the
Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property
within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government .... "
While the Court carefully circumscribed its enunciation of the doc-
trine,5 the principle of federal supremacy underlying Sabbatino now
1376 U.S. 898 (1964). See generally Falk, The Complexity of Sabbatino, 58 Am.
J. INT'L LAW 935 (1964); Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts:
Sabbatino, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 805 (1964); Mann, The Legal Consequences of Sab.
batino, 51 VA. L. REv. 604 (1965); Metzger, Act of State Doctrine Refined: The Sab-
batino Case, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 223; Reeves, The Act of State-Foreign Decisions
Cited in the Sabbatino Case: A Rebuttal and Memorandum of Law, 33 FOPDnIA
L. REv. 599 (1965); Reeves, The Sabbatino Case: The Supreme Court of the United
States Rejects a Proposed New Theory of Sovereign Relations and Restores the Act
of State Doctrine, 32 FoRuAm.a L. REv. 631 (1964); Wright, Reflections on the Sab.
batino Case, 59 Am. J. INT'L LAW 304 (1965); Comment, 63 MICH. L. Rv. 528 (1965).
2See generally FALK, THE RoLE or DoMEmSic COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER (1964); Baade, The Legal Effect of Cuban Expropriations in the United
States, 1963 DuKE L.J. 290; Falk, The Case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino Before the Supreme Court of the United States, 9 How. L.J. 116 (1963);
Metzger, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Relations, 23 U. Pirr. L. REv. 881
(1962); Comment, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1278 (1962).
3 876 U.S. at 425-27.
'Id. at 428.
' The Act of State doctrine might still not be applicable if an existing treaty or
"unambiguous agreement" governs the taking; if the foreign government no longer
exists or is not recognized by the United States at the time of suit; if the property
affected was not within the taking country's territory; or if the Executive suggests that
the doctrine need not be applied. 376 U.S. at 428. Other limitations on the holding
have been suggested. See Falk, The Complexity of Sabbatino, 58 Am. J. INT'L LAW 935,
939-46 (1964).
CONFLICT OF LAWS
seems to have been greatly expanded by the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank.8
The Iraq case involved the assets of King Faisal II of Iraq, who
was killed in the course of a revolution in that country in 1958.
Immediately after his death the succeeding revolutionary govern-
ment promulgated Ordinance No. 23, which purported to confiscate
all property owned by the royal family, wherever located.7 At the
time of King Faisal's death he had cash and securities on deposit
with Irving Trust Company in New York. The Iraqi Government
demanded these assets but Irving refused to accede and transferred
them to the First National City Bank of New York, which had ob-
tained letters of administration from the New York County Surro-
gate's Court with respect to the King's New York property. To re-
cover this property, the Republic of Iraq brought suit against First
National City Bank in the federal district court for the Southern
District of New York."
The district court did not decide whether New York law or fed-
eral law was controlling but held that in either case recovery should
be denied on the basis of the two familiar conflict of laws doctrines
that a forum will not enforce foreign laws which are either penal in
nature or which contravene the forum's public policy.9 The Second
Circuit, in a unanimous opinion, affirmed. Writing for the court,
Judge Friendly first characterized Ordinance No. 23 as confiscatory
and thus an act of state,'0 although he recognized that the tradi-
tional Act of State doctrine was inapplicable since the property con-
fiscated was not physically located within the acting country." He
then drew from the Sabbatino case a broad sanction for the federal
courts to make law governing the legal effect to be accorded such
S853 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 882 U.S. 1027 (1966), affirming 241 F. Supp.
567 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
7 The full text of the ordinance is set out in the district court opinion, 241 F. Supp.
at 570-71.
8 853 F.2d at 49-50.
* 241 F. Supp. at 574-75. See generally EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICr OF LAws § 37, at
133-34 (1962).
10 353 F.2d at 50. This characterization is sound only in the sense that the decree
would be sufficient to invoke the Act of State doctrine if the property in issue had
been in Iraq at the time of the taking. See RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RFLATONS LAW OF
T E UNITED STATES § 41, comment c (Proposed Off. Draft 1962). By so characterizing
the confiscation, however, the Second Circuit was able to equate the instant case with
Sabbatino and thus justify the power to promulgate a rule of federal common law
which the Sabbatino case had asserted in classic Act of State situations. See text ac-
companying notes 1-4 supra.
11353 F.2d at 50.
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acts by all courts in this country, both state and federal. 12 Relying on
Section 46 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, Friendly proceeded to promulgate the rule that a
foreign act affecting property within the United States will be given
effect only if "consistent with the policy and law of the United
States."13 A brief examination of constitutional provisions and
American traditions convinced the court that a confiscation without
compensation was in fact opposed to United States law and policy
and thus that the present taking could not be given legal effect.' 4
The opinion noted in conclusion that if the case had been brought
in the state courts, established New York precedent would have
dictated the same result.'5 The court added, however, that the
rule here formulated was binding on the states and therefore New
York courts could not give the foreign decree either less or greater
effect than this federal rule would indicate. 6
The Sabbatino case, from which the court purported to derive
its authority to promulgate exclusive federal law, involved the tra-
ditional Act of State situation: the property taken (American-owned
sugar) was located in Cuba, the taking country, at the time of the
confiscation.' 7 The Supreme Court held that the Act of State
doctrine, which it characterized as a federal court-made rule binding
on the states, precluded judicial re-examination of the legal validity
of the taking even though the taking was alleged to have been in
22 Id. at 50-51.
23 Id. at 51. To support the rule that no credence will be accorded foreign acts
which are violative of American public policy, and also to show that confiscations fall
under it, the court referred to Zwack v. Kraus Bros. & Co., 237 F.2d 255, 259 (2d Cir.
1956); Vladikavkasky Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456 (1934);
Plesch v. Banque Nationale de la Republique D'Haiti, 273 App. Div. 224, 77 N.Y.S.2d
43, aff'd, 298 N.Y. 573, 81 N.E.2d 106 (1948). Accord, Latvian State Cargo & Passenger
S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 (1951);
Bollack v. Societe Generale Pour Favoriser, 263 App. Div. 601, 33 N.Y.S.2d 986
(1942); A/S Merilaid & Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 189 Misc. 285, 71 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup.
Ct. 1947). But see Anderson v. N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, 289 N.Y. 9,
43 N.E.2d 502 (1942), finding a confiscation consistent with New York policy.
2"The court noted that if the ordinance had been promulgated by the United
States or an American state, it would fall under the prohibitions of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments and the bill of attainder clause. 353 F.2d at 51-52.
1 Although a statutory choice-of-law rule, N.Y. DECE.. EsT. LAw § 47, provided
that the disposition of a decedent's personalty should be governed by the law of the
country of his residence at the time of death, the court concluded that New York's
long-standing rule of non-recognition of confiscations contrary to public policy would
be controlling. 353 F.2d at 53. See New York cases cited note 13 supra. See also
Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
16 353 F.2d at 53.
" 376 U.S. at 403.
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violation of international law.-' While the Court stated that its
powers to make the rule and to bind the states by it were derived
from the Constitution, it did not identify the specific constitutional
provisions from which these powers originated.19 Essentially the
Court asserted the power to promulgate preemptive federal law
because classic Act of State cases involve two delicate elements: the
interrelationships between the branches of the federal government,
and the probable impact of judicial action on our ties with other
nations.20 The Court apparently felt that the area of foreign rela-
tions, primarily a province of the executive branch, is so sensitive
that the possibilities for destructive consequences are too great if
judicial decisions are made on the merits of foreign confiscation de-
crees; 21 hence the Act of State rule, which in effect requires all
courts in the United States to assume, without deciding, that
such decrees are legally binding. It is said that the rule not only.
prevents possible upsetting of the conduct of foreign relations by
judicial decision, but also gives the State Department the ability
to negotiate with other nations with greater confidence and free-
dom, secure in the knowledge that no court decision will embarrass
it in its pursuits.22
The essential factual distinction in Iraq is that the affected prop-
erty was located within the United States at the time of the taking.
Judge Friendly, reading Sabbatino expansively, concluded that since
under the facts of Iraq our foreign relations could similarly be af-
fected by judicial decision, he was justified in again fashioning a
federal rule which would constitute uniform law in the United
States.2 Beyond Sabbatino, his opinion adduces no significant au-
thority for this ruling; apparently the Iraq situation has never be-
fore been thought to be controlled by federal law.24 For analogous
"I Id. at 428.
291d. at 427 n.25. See Henkin, supra note 1, at 814-26, for a thorough discussion
of possible constitutional theories.
0 376 U.S. at 425.
2Id. at 423, 431-33.
2- See Metzger, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Relations, 23 U. Prrr. L. REv.
881 (1962). The doctrine as outlined in Sabbatino has been effectively overruled by Con-
gress. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 1013, as amended, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370 (e) (2)
(Supp. 1965). See note 49 infra and accompanying text. It is conceivable that the
Second Circuit was influenced by knowledge of this statute in formulating a sub-
stantive rule opposed to the philosophy of Sabbatino.
23 353 F.2d at 50-51.
-1 See cases cited note 13 supra. It should be noted, however, that the classic Act
of State doctrine was not regarded as an exclusively federal province until Sabbatino.
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support Friendly cited scholarly discussions of interstate stream
dispute cases and decisions concerning rights under federally-issued
negotiable instruments;2 5 but while these situations do illustrate the
promulgation of federal common law, the theories of constitutional
power on which they rest are far removed from the problem of
foreign relations involved in Iraq and Sabbatino.26
The very reasons Friendly uses to justify his power to make
federal law serve also to illustrate the fallacy of the substantive law
he proceeds to create. For if it is true here, as in the Sabbatino
situation, that judicial decisions on the merits of a foreign decree
may affect our foreign relations, then the only safe course, as the
Sabbatino court said, must be to preclude examination of that de-
cree by domestic courts altogether27 As Mr. Justice Harlan ex-
pressed it, the rationale behind the Act of State doctrine is that the
judiciary's "task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state
may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals .... "2
Further, Judge Friendly's opinion painstakingly emphasized the
point that the decree in Iraq was "an act of state."29 Yet the rule
he lays down in Iraq not only allows, but compels domestic courts
to pass on the validity of such acts by measuring them against the
2853 F.2d at 51 n.2. The authorities cited are WviGnT, FEDERAL COURTS § 60, at 214
(1963); Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 383, 408-09 & n.119 (1964); Henkin, supra note I, at 826-30. See also Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (federal paper); Hinderlider v. La-
Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (stream dispute).
2' In both of the types of cases mentioned, the Constitution grants a power to the
federal government without specifying what law is to govern the exercise of that
power. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8 (2) (granting Congress power to borrow); U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2 (granting Supreme Court original jurisdiction of disputes between states).
Therefore a federal common law is presumably required. On the other hand, the
substantive rules promulgated in Iraq and Sabbatino are obviously not required to fill
any vacuum created by the constitutional grant of foreign relations power to the federal
executive. They are merely thought to make the exercise of that power more
efficient by controlling the judicial handling of cases which may have an incidental
impact on foreign relations.
27 The Sabbatino Court did acknowledge that "we do not now pass on the Bern-
stein exception" a rule derived from Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche
Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiam), and which allows
a court to disregard the Act of State doctrine when advised that the Executive
has no objection to its doing so. 376 U.S. at 436. See Kane v. National Institute of
Agrarian Reform, 18 Fla. Supp. 116, 120 (Cir. Ct. 1961). Thus, although Sabbatino's
strong assertion of judicial independence in such cases may be viewed as under-
mining a rule which is posited upon a modicum of judicial deference to executive
pronouncement, the Bernstein exception is still a precedentially tenable rule at
present.
28 576 U.S. at 423.
29 353 F.2d at 50.
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standard of "United States law and policy" where the affected prop-
erty is within the United States at the time of the confiscatory decree.
Such a rule seems bluntly to contradict the philosophy of abstention
propounded by Sabbatino.
In reply it may be contended that a judicial decision on the
merits of a confiscation of the Iraq type is not nearly so likely to
interfere with the conduct of foreign affairs as a ruling on the
validity of a confiscation affecting property located within the
taking country. Insofar as such interference might arise because
the decision is regarded by the acting sovereign as insulting, this will
typically be true. In the case of an extra-territorial confiscation, the
foreign government has much less reason to expect blind recognition
from courts in the United States. Territorial notions of sovereignty
weigh heavily and where a nation lacks territorial jurisdiction at the
time of the confiscating decree, it has little standing to complain of
non-recognition by a country which did have such jurisdiction. 0
Such a decision seems less likely to "vex the peace of nations."3' 1
However, whether interference with the State Department's goals
will occur in a given case is quite another question.32 Suppose
some property falling under the decree (even if not the specific
property under litigation) comes into the hands of the foreign gov-
ernment and the United States executive is negotiating for redress
of the rights of the original owner, who may be a United States citi-
zen. A judicial holding, particularly by a federal court, that the de-
cree is "consistent with the law and policy of the United States"
might seriously weaken the Executive's bargaining position; con-
versely, a judicial refusal to recognize the decree might be offensive
enough to chill negotiations and lessen the probabilities of a favor-
able settlement.33 In the Iraq case itself no such negotiations were
being conducted, but a contrary situation is not farfetched. Indeed,
if the United States is conducting sufficiently sensitive negotiations
with the confiscating country on an entirely unrelated matter, a de-
cision on the merits of an existing confiscation decree might be
highly upsetting.
Whether an embarrassing judicial decision is actually forth-
30 376 U.S. at 432; see Henkin, supra note 1, at 828 n.80 and cases cited therein;
RE.VATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 11-25 (Proposed Off.
Draft 1962).
3'Quoting from Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918).
82See Henkin, supra note 1, at 828.
"Cf. 376 U.S. at 432-33.
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coming or not, the very prospect of such a decision to some extent
ties the hands of the Executive in sensitive cases. Given the possi-
bility of a decision of this nature, United States diplomatic negotia-
tors cannot proceed with full confidence and assurance; they must
act gingerly, constantly mindful of the possibility of an adverse
court holding. It may be thought that such cases will not occur fre-
quently, but that fact scarcely serves to minimize these problems
when they do arise.
If the result of the Second Circuit's substantive rule is not to
aid the operations of the national executive, it nonetheless benefits
other United States interests. For the court observes that
"Foreigners entrusting their property to custodians in this country
are entitled to expect this historic policy [of opposition to con-
fiscations] to be followed save when the weightiest reasons call
for a departure."'
Underlying this statement may be the realization that it is to the
advantage of United States citizens to encourage foreign investors
to place their assets with American financial institutions, and that
protection of those assets from confiscation is a part of that en-
couragement. The rule of the case accrues directly to the economic
benefit of American banks and trust companies and their owners,
and also tends to restore a favorable international balance of pay-
ments to the United States by inducing a greater flow of foreign
capital into this country. Moreover, it is at least arguable that this
latter interest does fall into the category of problems associated with
"our relations with other members of the international community '85
-the only problems with which the Supreme Court in Sabbatino
said justified exclusive federal control.
The substantive rule the court propounded was derived from
section 46, Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States.36 It is closely related to the "public policy exception" found
3153 F.2d at 52.
315376 U.S. at 425.
1e ,§ 46. Acts of Foreign State Affecting Interests Outside Territory
"(1) The rule stated in § 41 [the Act of State doctrine] does not prevent examination
of the validity of an act of a foreign state with respect to things located, or other
interests localized, within the territory of another state even though the acting state
had jurisdiction to take the action under the rules stated in the Restatement of this
Subject.
"(2) Courts in the United States give effect to acts described in Subsection (1)' of
this Section only if they are consistent with the policy and law of the United States."




in conflict of laws doctrine3 7 and has long been applied by United
States courts, as well as courts of a number of other nations, in deal-
ing with foreign confiscations of property within the forum. 8 How-
ever, it does not appear, and the Restatement does not imply, that
the public policy rule has ever been viewed as a matter of federal
law which binds the states. The Second Circuit's holding in Iraq
is unique in this regard, and was achieved through the characteri-
zation of the decree at issue as an "act of state" having ramifications
for the conduct of foreign relations.3 9
Like the "public policy exception," the rule of section 46
is far from easy to apply with precision and consistency. Judge
Friendly thought Ordinance No. 23 inconsistent with American
law and policy, reasoning that if it had been enacted by an Ameri-
can state or the federal government, it would clearly contravene the
fifth and fourteenth amendments and the bill of attainder clause.40
Yet his opinion sheds no light on the question of whether those con-
stitutional provisions are always to be mechanically applied full-force
to test the validity of an act of a foreign state whose internal con-
stitutional limitations may differ fundamentally from our own.41
A -test based on an attenuated version of the Constitution might
prove difficult to apply; for example, hypothesize a case like Iraq
with the exception that some compensation is paid, although not an
adequate amount by United States standards; or suppose a con-
fiscation not discriminatory in nature, but equally applicable to all
Iraq citizens. These situations seem somewhat less obnoxious to our
Constitution and pose the question of how inconsistent with United
States law and policy the foreign decree must be. Past state court
decisions offer little guidance, for they are characteristically am-
biguous and apply state rather than federal standards.42 The test is
subject to the same criticisms of irrelevance to the question of forum
interest, inexactitude, and judicial manipulation which have been
37 This "exception" states that, notwithstanding other conflicts rules, a foreign
law will not be given effect if it is contrary to a strong public policy of the forum.
See generally Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918); Katzen-
bach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate
and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087 (1956); Paulsen & Sovern, Public Policy and
the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUm. L. Rav. 969 (1956).
38 See cases cited note 13 supra; Grzybowski, Public Policy and Soviet Law in the
West After World War II, 4 Azr. J. CoMe. L. 365 (1955).
-1 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
"8$53 F.2d at 51-52.
, Id. at 52.
"2 See cases cited note 13 supra.
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levied against the "public policy exception" in its more mundane
domestic setting.43
Perhaps a more workable and predictable approach to foreign
confiscations can result from application of the principle of govern-
mental interest analysis which has been advocated by leading scholars
in the field of domestic choice of law.44 According to one proponent
of this principle, it is a basic premise that the forum will apply its
own law if it has any governmental interest in doing so. If no such
interest is discernible, the law of the interested foreign jurisdiction
will be given effect.45 In pursuing such an analysis, it should be
noted that two peculiar features appear in foreign confiscation cases
which are not present in purely domestic choice of law problems.
First, the forum interest which is to be taken into account may in-
clude both federal and state interests. It would seem that when the
opposing law is that of a foreign nation, both federal and state courts
should regard either a federal or state interest as a "forum" interest.
If federal and state interests conflict in such a way as to bear sig-
nificantly on United States foreign relations, the teaching of Sab-
batino is that the federal interest must predominate.46
A second feature peculiar to foreign confiscations is that the
forum interest in a given case may be advanced either by upholding
the foreign decree without examination or by examining and pos-
sibly rejecting it. The major federal interests which might be as-
serted in a judicial refusal to examine the foreign decree include the
facilitation of executive negotiations and the avoidance of offense
to the foreign sovereign. Both of these interests are attributable to
the national executive; neither federal nor state judges are com-
petent to estimate their extent in a given case.4 7 Both interests may
be present in cases of extra- as well as intra-territorial confiscations.
An efficacious rule from the judiciary's point of view would be a
presumption of the absence of any interest which would be furthered
by not adjudicating the validity of the decree unless the executive,
upon adequate notice, advises the court of its desire that the decree
'" See Katzenbach, supra note 37; Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 37.
"See generally CAvERs, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS (1965); CuRinn, SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963); Comment, 63 COLUM. L. Rav. 1212 (1963):
Note, 1965 DuKE L.J. 623.
,5 CuRmE, op. cit. supra note 44, at 183-84.
46 376 U.S. at 425-27.
,7 See Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recognition
of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461, 479 (1963); Katzenbach,
supra note 37, at 1153-54.
[Vol. 1966: 828
Vol. 1966: 828] CONFLICT OF LAWS
be upheld without examination.48 While the State Department, in
the course of the Sabbatino litigation, objected to the imposition of
this burden upon it,49 Congress has nevertheless imposed it by
statute by dictating that, unless the President advises to the con-
trary, the courts are to disregard the Act of State doctrine if the
confiscation in question was in violation of international law.50
It seems improbable that the additional onus on the State Depart-
ment which would result from broadening this rule to include cases
of extra-territorial confiscations would be objectionable.
The possibility of an exception to Judge Friendly's "public
policy" rule for executive suggestions may be implicit in his ac-
ceptance51 of United States v. Belmont 2 and United States v. Pink,53
in which the Supreme Court forbade judicial re-examination of
,8 Cf. Committee on Int'l Law, New York City Bar Ass'n, Resolution, 14 REcoPD oF
N.Y.C.B.A. 228 (1959). An executive suggestion that a confiscating decree be upheld
without examination might be denoted a "reverse Bernstein" rule. See note 27 supra.
10 Brief for Department of State as Amicus Curiae. See also Hearings on the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 618-19 (1964) (statement of the Executive Department objecting to pro-
posed statute).
" Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 1013, 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (e) (2)
(1964). See generally 59 Am. J. INT'L L. 366 (1965); 65 COLUM. L. Rav. 530
(1965); 10 ViLL. L. Rav. 509 (1965). The 1965 amendment makes the statute per-
manent. The House Committee held extensive hearings and heard divergent testimony
by a number of distinguished witnesses. Hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1965
Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965). The
divergency is illustrated by comparing the testimony of Professor Olmstead, id. at 576,
with that of Professor Henkin, id. at 1060. An interesting shift of position is evident by
comparing the testimony of Attorney General Katzenbach, id. at 1234, with Katzenbach,
supra note 37, at 1153-54.
The amendment as originally adopted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
would have suspended operation of the Act of State doctrine (absent an objection
from the President) if a violation of international law were merely alleged. See S.
REP. No. 1188, pt. 1, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1964); Metzger, The Act-of-State Doc-
trine Refined, 1964 Sup. CT. RiEv. 223, 242 n.50. The conference version which
was ultimately passed was altered to "make it clear that it [the amendment]
does not apply if no violation of international law principles is found ...." H.R. RaP.
No. 1925, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEvs 3890
(1964). (Emphasis added.) Presumably, this means that a court must determine as a
preliminary question the existence of a violation and only if one is found is submission
to executive suggestion required. Yet this "preliminary determination" seems tanta-
mount to adjudication on the merits of the confiscation, the very thing the Act of
State doctrine and the statutory provision for deference to the President are designed
to avoid. The only case yet decided under the statute is the Sabbatino case on
remand, where the district court held that it need not make a preliminary finding as
to whether international law had been violated, since the Second Circuit in the course
of the previous appeal had already found such a violation. Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957, 979-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), 6 VA. J. INT'L L. 173.
'353 F.2d at 52.
301 U.S. 324 (1937).
' 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
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Soviet confiscations of property in the United States which had sub-
sequently been ratified by executive agreements between the two
nations. 54 Essentially the same reasons exist for giving predominance
to the Executive's wishes whether or not they have been embodied in
a formal agreement. 55 It is probably unnecessary to require that the
executive suggestion be given conclusive weight; the desired result
can be accomplished if it is given, as a matter of federal law, "great
weight" as evidence of the existence of a federal interest in non-
adjudication, in somewhat the same way that executive suggestions
of sovereign immunity are handled.5 6
In the absence of such a suggestion, at least two interests in
denying effect to the foreign confiscation may exist. If the owner
of the property taken is a United States citizen, both federal and
r" Id. at 230-32; 301 U.S. at 326-27, 331-32. See generally Stevenson, Effect of Recog-
nition on the Application of Private International Law Norms, 51 CoLUM. L. REV. 710,
719 (1951).
r See Cardozo, supra note 47, at 479. Judge Friendly's opinion does not wholly
foreclose the possibility of a court's deferring to an executive suggestion given outside
the context of a formal agreement. He noted that in Iraq the State Department
had disclaimed any objection to adjudication on the merits, but he failed to con-
sider what effect an expression of contrary desire by the Executive might have. 353
F.2d at 52. Judge McLean's opinion in the district court strongly hinted that such an
expression might be given some weight. 241 F. Supp. at 573, 575. Compare Latvian
State Cargo &_ Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1951),
holding conclusive a state department statement that the confiscation in question
should not be recognized, with Anderson v. N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij,
289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502 (1942), in which the court, while doubtless influenced by
the State Department's suggestion that the confiscation should be recognized, refused
to give it conclusive weight and instead purported to find independently that the
confiscation was consistent with New York public policy. See Zwack v. Kraus Bros.
& Co., 93 F. Supp. 963, 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), which implies that effect would be given
to an expression by the executive that United States policy requires recognition of a
foreign confiscation of property within the United States.
'1 The grant of immunity to a sovereign whose person or property is the subject
of suit is in effect a covariant of executive will. The Supreme Court has ruled that
the federal courts are bound by a "recognition and allowance" by the State Depart-
ment of a claim of immunity. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943).
In the absence of a formal suggestion the Court has stated that failure of the State
Department to allow a claim of immunity is an "important reason" for denying it.
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 n.1 (1945). The State Department
does not, doubtless as a matter of courtesy, classify its certifications as judicially
unassailable: "It is realized that a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the
courts but it is felt that the courts are less likely to allow a plea of sovereign immunity
where the executive has declined to do so." Letter from acting Legal Adviser of State
Department to acting Attorney General, May 19, 1952, in 26 DEP'T STATE BuL. 984,985
(1952). See Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, SA., 197 F. Supp. 710, 724-25 (E.D. Va.), afj'd, 295
F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) (per curiam). See generally Cardozo, supra note 46, at 469-76;
Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67 HARv. L. REv.
608 (1954); Garcia-Mora, The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity of Foreign States and its
Recent Modifications, 42 VA. L. Ryv. 335 (1956).
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state governments have an interest in compensating him or minimiz-
ing his loss. If the owner is a foreigner who entrusted his property
to an American custodian in reliance on the protection of United
States law, both federal and state governments arguably have
economic interests in providing that protection.57 In both of the
above situations, the foreign decree should be upheld only if it
complies fully with the standards of the Constitution; no attenuated
test will uphold the reasonable expectations of foreign investors
or adequately protect the interests of American owners. If no
United States or state interests are perceived by the court, it should
give effect to the foreign decree without further inquiry into United
States "policy" regarding confiscations. The interest-analysis ap-
proach described here thus has an additional advantage over the
method of invoking, as the Iraq court does, the catchall rubric of
public policy; such a mechanical adjudicatory technique may result
in the invalidation of a foreign decree when in fact no United States
interest exists that will be served by doing so.5s
In the light of the Supreme Court's expressions in Sabbatino
of aversion to judicial deference to executive suggestion, 9 it is
unlikely that the technique described above will be adopted by
judicial decision. It is possible, however, that a future case with
sufficiently vital foreign affairs ramifications might prompt congres-
sional action in promulgating such a rule. Indeed, the magnitud
of the Sabbatino ruling precipitated a similar legislative rebuke.6o
It is undeniable that the method here suggested for judicial
disposition of cases arising from extra-territorial confiscations, like
the current approach to confiscations of property within the acting
state dictated by Sabbatino and its statutory amendment, has the
regrettable effect of occasionally sacrificing the interests of meri-
torious litigants in American courts for the convenience, and per-
haps the necessity, of giving the State Department free reign in the
57 See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
" For example, suppose a cargo of sugar owned by a Cuban national is being
shipped from Cuba to China aboard an Indonesian freighter. While the vessel is
anchored in the port of New York to discharge other cargo, the Castro government
issues a decree confiscating the sugar. A representative of the Cuban government
atfaches and brings suit in a New York court to establish its title against the original
owner. Here no apparent American interest would be served by refusal to recognize
the confiscation; yet according to Judge Friendly's formulation, it violates United
States policy and thus is not cognizable in any United States court.
" 376 U.S. at 436.
00 See note 22 supra.
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conduct of foreign relations. A satisfactory ultimate resolution of
this conflict of interest seems beyond the scope of judicial power;
perhaps it can be accomplished only by a congressional decision to
compensate the hapless litigant from federal funds when the
Executive's needs take precedence over his interests. To date, how-
ever, Congress has made only limited overtures in this direction.6 1
In any event, the judicial solution postulated above would minimize
the likelihood of unnecessarily defeating the litigant's right to be
heard on the merits, provided that litigant is one whom the forum
has an interest in protecting.
61 The Government's investment guaranty program furnishes a means for American
investors to insure against foreign confiscations of their property, but the program's
coverage is so uncertain and its benefits so limited that it has not proven to be of great
practical importance. See Act for International Development of 1961, §§ 221-24, 75
Stat. 429, 22 U.S.C. § 2181-84 (1964); Armstrong, The United States Government's
Investment Guaranty Program, 20 Bus. LAw. 27 (1964); Scheiner, The Foreign Invest-
ment Guaranty Program, 35 PA. B.A.Q. 41 (1963).
